Flight Data Results from Ethiopia 302 and the MCAS System - Smoking Gun or False Lead?

737 MAX throttle quadrant showing trim wheel and stab trim cutout switches (lower right).

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that, after preliminary analysis of flight data from the downed Ethiopian 737 (ET302), investigators now believe the controversial Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) activated and may have played a part in the accident.  This finding is significant because the MCAS system has now been implicated in both this crash and the Lion Air crash which occurred last year.

MCAS - What is It?

To recap, the MCAS system was installed on the 737 Max aircraft to mitigate some unique handling characteristics of the new model which differed from older 737s. Boeing originally chose not to document this new system in the aircraft flight manual, but has since briefed all Max operators on the existence and function of the system in the aftermath of the Lion Air crash.

Among the reasons Boeing engineers may have had for not including the system in the flight manual are that the system was only supposed to ever activate during aerodynamic stall conditions in manually controlled flight, which in normal operations would never be seen. Entire careers are flown without ever seeing an actual stall, so this rationale might have been thought sound.

The problem for the MCAS system wasn't necessarily its intended operation, which was to be rarely if ever seen, but rather any potential failure modes. Unintended activation of the system due to a mechanical fault has now been suggested as a factor in both Max crashes. Flight data from the Lion Air crash show the pilots repeatedly fighting the inputs from a misfiring MCAS system, and according to latest reports, the MCAS system also activated on the mishap Ethiopian airliner.

Adding to the controversy of the existence of an undocumented system is the revelation that the system can be activated by a single angle of attack (AOA) sensor. Angle of attack sensors measure the angle of the relative wind over the wings. Too great of an angle between the wing and the airflow over it will result in an aerodynamic stall wherein the wing stops producing lift.

The questions being asked involve the engineering decision to use the input of a single AOA sensor to trigger the MCAS system to operate. There are two (or more) AOA sensors installed on all airliners which among other things are used to provide "stick shaker" stall warning to pilots if they get too slow or approach a stall. Again, a stall is something that most airline pilots will never see outside of a training simulator where stall recovery is practiced routinely.

What Did the ET302 Pilots Know about the MCAS System?

Lion Air JT-610 crashed on October 29, 2018. The investigation of that crash first brought the MCAS system and a malfunctioning AOA sensor to light. On November 7th, Boeing released an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) to all 737 Max operators. This bulletin mentioned that erroneous AOA signals can cause the trim to run uncommanded by the pilot. The directed remedy is to apply the runaway stabilizer trim checklist which directs the use of the center pedestal mounted stabilizer trim cutout switches. The text of the bulletin is as follows:

The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous AOA data. Boeing would like to call attention to an AOA failure condition that can occur during manual flight only.

This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition. In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of the following indications and effects:

- Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
- Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
- Increasing nose down control forces.
- Inability to engage autopilot.
- Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
- IAS DISAGREE alert.
- ALT DISAGREE alert.
- AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
- FEEL DIFF PRESS light.

In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the 737 - 8 / - 9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.

A subsequent Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) directed this information to be included in the flight manual of all Max aircraft within three days.

In my view, it is reasonable to assume that the ET302 pilots were well aware of the MCAS system, its possible failure mode due to an erroneous AOA sensor, and the steps to be taken to remedy the malfunction.

Why Didn't They Just Turn it Off?

The investigation of the Lion Air crash has revealed that on the flight immediately preceding the mishap flight, an off-duty 737 qualified pilot was occupying the jumpseat. That aircraft also suffered the same malfunction of the AOA sensor resulting in uncommanded nose down trim. On that flight, however, the guest pilot recommended that the operating pilots use the stabilizer trim cutout switches, which they did. That flight landed uneventfully.

The pilots on the subsequent Lion Air flight fought against the nose down trim commands continually, but never did deactivate the electric stabilizer trim with the cutout switches. The errant automated trim commands eventually trimmed the aircraft into an unflyable condition.

It would seem easy to Monday morning QB the actions of the Lion Air mishap pilots, but it must be remembered that there were many other things happening at the same time. One important thing to note is that the stick shaker activated right at liftoff and continued for the entire flight. The stick shaker is a device that literally vibrates the control yoke when an aircraft approaches an actual stall. It is loud and disconcerting when activated. The pilots were no doubt startled and distracted.

Another point to note is that the MCAS inputs would not "present" like a traditional runaway trim situation. Typically, a runaway trim malfunction in a simulator would simulate a stuck switch where the trim wheel would run continuously in one direction. During the mishap Lion flight, the flight data recorder showed the pilot actively trimming back against the MCAS inputs followed by a few seconds delay when the MCAS system would reactivate and start trimming forward again.

Another system called "speed trim" installed on earlier and subsequent 737 models can also run the electric trim with the autopilot disengaged, so it is not completely unusual to see the trim wheel spinning by itself with the autopilot off. This "negative training" may have contributed to the pilots not focusing on the uncommanded movement of the trim wheel even though speed trim only functions with flaps extended while the MCAS system only functions with the flaps retracted.

What Happened Then on ET302?

The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorders from ET302 have been recovered and sent to France where they were downloaded and decoded by the BEA, the French equivalent of the NTSB. The data from the recorders have not been released to the public, however investigators have an "emerging consensus" that the MCAS system activated and contributed to the accident. The story also noted that this preliminary finding is subject to revision.

The pilots of ET302, however, had something that the Lion pilots did not, and that is a detailed description and knowledge of the MCAS system and the procedure to disable it by throwing two easily reached switches. Without more information from the accident investigation, it is simply too early to reach any definitive conclusions about the fate of that airliner.

What's Next for the Max?

As an aviation blogger, the past few days have been simultaneously hope inspiring and depressing. Hope inspiring as many people understand, or make a good faith attempt to understand, the underlying issues surrounding the 737 Max. But also depressing as random fanbois, trolls, and low information, yet self proclaimed experts, happen by my comments section to disgorge their dubious wisdom on things about which they know little or nothing.

Mencken was Right: No One Ever went Broke Underestimating the Intelligence of the Public

One commenter offered, based on no information other than two 737s had crashed, that all of them should be grounded. I pointed out that by that logic, it would be even more beneficial to ground all airplanes everywhere as it would be safer still. The response was "I didn't say all airplanes should be grounded" displaying an ironclad grip on logical fallacies.

When I noted that the MCAS system could be completely deactivated using two switches mounted on the center console, a commenter replied that well, "maybe the switches reconnected themselves". Other than the testing of those switches being a mandatory preflight item, this commenter has obviously confused the Boeing 737 with the SkyNet model T-1000 Terminator which can rewire itself automatically.

Lastly, when one commenter [Hi Scott!] boldly opined that the 737 was the worst airplane he'd ever flown on, I replied that my passenger experience is usually more dependent upon the particular airline and class of service rather than the aircraft type. This big brained person assured me, however, that no, none of that mattered. He apparently would rather sit in a non reclining 28 inch pitch economy seat on a Spirit A320 than a first class seat on a JAL 737.  [Sigh]

Public Relations and Marketing Wins

So the FAA bowed to international and media pressure and grounded all Max aircraft, which is proving to be a minor inconvenience to most operators of the aircraft. I was personally walking out to a Max to fly to Phoenix when the announcement came. Someone somewhere had done some preparations and an -800 was towed to the gate by maintenance about 10 minutes later for a slightly delayed departure.

We of course are now treated to the circular logic of all the "I told you so" stories. The process starts as media sensationalism whips up a gullible and credulous public followed by outraged calls for the aircraft to be grounded. After weather-vaning politicians cave into public pressure, preening media talking heads then get to state that something must have been really been wrong. And so it goes.

Make no mistake: this grounding has more to do with public relations and marketing than safety. As of yet, there is very little evidence that the two Max crashes are in any way related other than the most superficial of circumstances. But the tsunami of media scare stories and sensationalism showed no signs of abatement, so this was the correct decision. 

The FAA cited "newly" discovered satellite data which finally swayed their decision.They are referring to the ADS-B tracking system which relays flight parameters to air traffic control through satellite. This information, however, was publicly available shortly after the crash and it does show some minor altitude excursions, though nothing is conclusive.

The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder from the Ethiopian crash have been recovered and sent to France for analysis. Again, prescient commenters noted that this was a good thing because, of course, had they been sent to the US, American investigators would falsify any result finding the US producer of the aircraft at fault. I actually agree with this decision in spite of the slander against the integrity of the NTSB and other US investigators. Having French investigators analyze the data will deflect the inevitable cries of bias should the investigation find fault in anything except the aircraft itself.

What Next?

What happens next is we wait for the data from ET302 to be downloaded and released. When that happens and a likely cause of the accident can be discerned, the Max will be cleared to fly. Notice that I didn't say that this clearance will in any way be dependent on the outcome of the investigation. The aircraft will be flying again in a matter of weeks regardless of the findings.

Why you ask? Should the MCAS system be implicated in this crash (unlikely in my opinion), there will be software fixes and training updates offered. As I've noted many times, the system can be deactivated completely through the use of two center console mounted switches. Even then, the system should only activate in the case of gross pilot negligence resulting in an aerodynamic stall or, as in the case of the Lion crash, an errant sensor input due to a mechanical malfunction. 

The software fixes will preclude the activation of the system due to the failure of a single sensor. The training updates will reemphasize to all operators that undesirable electric trim inputs can be inhibited through the use of the center console mounted stab cutout switches. 

Should the MCAS system not be implicated in the ET302 crash, the Max will be back in the air that much sooner. Make no mistake, all airline crashes are tragedies of the highest order for everyone involved. The object of any investigation is to find out what happened and to take measures to prevent any future recurrence. Commercial aviation is one of the safest, if not the safest means of transportation available. 

What will be left is a mopping up by the lawyers.


Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. 

Is the Boeing 737 Max 8 Safe?

737 Max 8

This past Sunday, an Ethiopian Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa to Nairobi with 157 passengers and crew. There were no survivors. This is the second crash of a Max 8 variant of the 737 in five months after the crash of a Lion Air Max 8 last October.

An undocumented system was brought under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash and now questions are being raised as to whether this same system, known as maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), might have played a roll in this latest crash. If that is found to be the case, the safety of the aircraft itself will be called into question.

What We Know

At the current time, the cause of both accidents is unknown as the accident investigation is still underway on the Lion Air crash and the Ethiopian Air crash investigation is just getting under way. The flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders have been recovered from both accidents and are being analyzed.

The flight recorder data from the Lion Air crash suggests that the pilots were having control difficulty due to erroneous inputs from the aircraft's MCAS system which itself received faulty inputs from a malfunctioning angle of attack (AOA) sensor. It is this errant sensor and its maintenance history that investigators are focusing on.

Initial reports from the Ethiopian Air crash suggest that the aircraft experienced control difficulties shortly after takeoff. Data from a flight tracking and reporting system known as ADS-B show highly unstable vertical velocity and airspeed readouts which were similar to the airspeed and altitude excursions of the Lion Air mishap aircraft.

Unconfirmed reports from listeners on the frequency reported that the Ethiopian pilots stated that they had unreliable airspeed indications and were declaring an emergency.

And right now, that's it. There are similarities, but no confirmation that the same system brought down both aircraft.

Is It Safe?

Given that we know little about the cause of the first accident and nothing about the cause of the second, a grounding of this model aircraft is premature. I am qualified and current in this model aircraft and am confident that it is as safe as any aircraft flying. Airplanes sometimes crash. It is always a tragedy when they do, but barring a definitive indictment of the design, there is no reason to overreact.

Even should the MCAS system be found primarily at fault, the system can be completely deactivated by two easily reached switches on the center console of the cockpit. Why the Lion Air pilots didn't take this action is unknown, but the investigation should eventually reveal the cause. A similar malfunction occurred on a previous flight of the mishap aircraft, and those pilots took the correct action and landed uneventfully. Questions as to why the aircraft flew again without being properly repaired should be asked.

In the event of unreliable airspeed, which can happen to any aircraft independent of model, routine practice of this malfunction in the simulator should make it a non-event. I recently underwent this training myself, but the basics of pitch and power date back to Wilbur and Orville. Recognition is the toughest part, but after that, known pitch and power settings will keep the aircraft from stalling and in control.

I don't mention these questions to cast blame, but rather to answer critics who don't understand aviation or engage in magical thinking. The Max is still a 737 at heart and flies nearly identically to the other four models of the aircraft that I have flown. So yes, it is safe, and I'd gladly put my family on one and fly it myself with no reservations.


Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. 

The Lion Air Crash: What You Need to Know

Lion Air B737 MAX 8 (Wikimedia Commons)

On October 29 of this year, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea 11 minutes after departing Jakarta for Pangkal Pinang with the loss of all 189 souls on board. What first called special attention to this accident was that the mishap aircraft was a brand new MAX 8 version of the venerable Boeing 737, and had been delivered to the airline less than a year earlier.

Also of note has been the revelation in the wake of the ongoing accident investigation that a new safety system designed to prevent stalls had been installed on the aircraft, but had not been publicized nor documented in the flight manuals used by flight crews. The flight data recorder (FDR) from the mishap aircraft has been recovered and data from that recorder shows that an errant sensor on the aircraft may have provided bad data to this new system possibly implicating it in the accident. 

The investigation is ongoing and it is inappropriate to assign blame to any system or persons until the completion of the accident review, but as there is much misunderstanding concerning what information is already known, we can take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.

An Undocumented System

The new safety system installed on the MAX version of the 737 known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS, was designed to provide a nose-down trim input during manual flight as the aircraft approached a stall. What this means in simple terms is that if a pilot is flying the aircraft without the autopilot, and is for whatever reason flying the aircraft well below a safe speed, the aircraft will automatically run the stabilizer trim forward which will have the effect of making the controls heavier to hold.

In addition, once full power is eventually applied to recover from the stall, the forward trim assists the pilot in keeping the more powerful engines on the MAX from overpowering the recovery by exceeding elevator authority. The nose tends to want to rise during a stall recovery and forward trim lessens that effect.

Here is an excerpt from the multi-user message sent by Boeing on November 10 to all 737 MAX operators:

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

It is also important to note that any pilot finding him or herself in this position has real problems and has already disregarded the "stick shaker" stall warning system which vibrates the control column well before reaching stall speed. The reason the system was installed on the newest MAX 8 versions of the 737 and not earlier models is apparently the discovery during flight testing of some unfavorable stall characteristics on the new aircraft that did not exist on earlier models.

Angle of Attack

Ok, so far so good. A new safety system was installed. Who can argue with a safety system? The problem that the Lion Air flight encountered, however, was some sort of malfunction in information coming from a sensor being fed to the new system. This sensor is known as the "angle of attack" or AOA sensor. The angle of attack of a wing is the angle between the chord line of a wing and the relative wind moving across that wing. A chord line is an imaginary line which runs from the leading edge to the trailing edge of a cross section of a wing. 

A wing which exceeds the critical angle of attack stalls, which is where boundary layer separation occurs and the wing stops producing lift. If you've ever stuck your hand out the window of a moving car and made a wing with it, you've experienced how changing the angle of attack changes lift. For more on AOA, see here.

The angle of attack sensor is essentially a very small wing on a hinge mounted on the fuselage which measures direction of the relative wind passing the aircraft. You can see them installed near the pitot tubes on most airliners and there are usually at least two installed for redundancy. AOA data is used by a number of systems on an airliner, but happened to be one of the primary inputs to the MCAS system on the MAX 8 aircraft. It is here where problems occurred.

Faulty Input Means Faulty Output (GIGO)

Analysis of the flight data recorder from the Lion Air flight revealed that the data from the two AOA sensors installed on the aircraft did not match. The left AOA sensor was recorded as giving erroneous information during the entire flight. An erroneous AOA information feed or some other malfunction is suspected to have caused the activation of the MCAS system resulting in the system trimming the aircraft in a nose down direction. During the entire flight the pilots trimmed in a nose up direction to keep the aircraft flyable, but at some point stopped trimming and allowed the MCAS system to trim the aircraft nose down to an unflyable condition.

The reason for this is unknown and may be determined when the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is recovered. Also unknown is why the pilots never used the two stabilizer cutout switches located on the center stand just behind the throttles. These switches remove all electric power from the stabilizer trim motor and would thereby deactivate the MCAS trim inputs.

In fact, on the previous flight of the mishap aircraft, a failure of a similar nature also resulted in uncommanded nose down trim inputs and required the pilots of that flight to use the cutout switches to deactivate the electric trim system. The 737 has a large manual trim control wheel mounted on the center stand that can be turned to adjust the stabilizer trim. It is normally not touched but spins as the electric trim motor is engaged. The pilots on that previous flight used the manual trim wheel to adjust the trim to safely land.

The aircraft did have maintenance performed on various airspeed, AOA and other systems in the days leading up to the mishap flight in response to several defects being written up on previous flights. The exact nature of the malfunctions and degraded systems on the mishap aircraft has yet to be determined as the investigation proceeds, but an AOA sensor had been replaced in response to writeups on the previous flight. A closer look at the flight data from both the mishap flight and the previous flight can be found here.

Protecting Pilots From Themselves

There is an ongoing debate in the aviation community about the benefits and liabilities of cockpit automation. This debate has centered on the effect that highly automated cockpits have tended to make pilots rusty in their "stick and rudder" or basic flying skills. Make no mistake, automation has been a boon to both aviation economics and safety, but it is now being realized that it is not an unmitigated benefit.

At question is the design philosophy incorporated into automation. Years ago, the two main commercial airframe manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, diverged in their approach to flight control automation. While Boeing aircraft have always incorporated the ability to disconnect all automation, Airbus on the other hand was a pioneer in designing "fly by wire" flight controls into their aircraft. This meant that pilot inputs were sent to a computer and the computer controlled the aircraft. There was no ability to completely bypass the computer and control the aircraft directly.

The revelation that a safety system designed to prevent an inattentive pilot from stalling the aircraft was surreptitiously installed will raise questions as to whether Boeing has decided to follow Airbus down the road of incorporating behind the scenes automation to prevent pilots from doing stupid things. Remember, the original anti-stall device was always the pilot. Warning systems could signal that the airplane was getting slow, but the pilot was always the backstop. Given that the MCAS system can be disabled by the trim cutout switches makes the above scenario less likely.

The alternate explanation to the installation of the MCAS system is that it is simply designed for the mitigation of unfavorable stall characteristics as mentioned above. This raises the question, though, of why the system would not be documented in the aircraft flight manual. Surely pilots would want to know of these unfavorable characteristics and also of the existence a system designed to compensate for those effects. Since the system was undocumented, the pilots of the mishap flight likely had no idea why their trim kept running forward nor were they expecting such behavior.

What's It Doing Now?

It is imperative, then, that pilots are well versed in not only the normal operation of their aircraft, but also in any possible failure mode and are ready and able to assume complete command at any time that the automation is not performing as expected.

Several high profile accidents such as Air France 447 and Asiana 214 serve to highlight the potential pitfalls of flying highly automated aircraft. Part of the problem confronting pilots of these aircraft is the danger of becoming confused about what the aircraft automation is doing. Known as "mode confusion", pilots can make the mistake of assuming that the automation will perform in a certain manner and become confused if it doesn't.

This was one of the findings in the accident review of Asiana 214 which crashed into the seawall at San Francisco. The pilots realized too late that the mode that had been selected would not do what they were expecting. They were then unable to prevent the aircraft from crashing short of the runway.

Now extrapolate mode confusion to a malfunctioning system which the pilots were unaware was even installed, and you can see the difficult situation they faced.

In Conclusion

The cause(s) for the crash of Lion Air 610 are currently unknown and will remain so until the investigation is complete. In the interim, new knowledge of the existence of an undocumented safety system installed on the 737 MAX should serve to further the debate on the appropriate role of cockpit automation.

How Fast are We Really Going?

Airspeed is Life!

One of the most common questions we get asked by passengers is how fast we're going. Usually it is asked about takeoff or landing as it is easy to find out how fast we're going at cruise. For that, simply look at the inflight entertainment system which gives a readout from the onboard GPS system. When I give an answer to the takeoff or landing speed, I'll say it depends. On what you may ask? It depends on many factors, to include the weight of the aircraft, the wind, the airport elevation, the runway conditions (wet or dry) and even the terrain surrounding the airport.

Even after explaining all that, I have to give an approximate answer because our airspeed up front is given to us in knots and not the more familiar miles or kilometers per hour. A "knot" is a nautical measure of speed which means nautical miles per hour. A nautical mile is 6076 feet as opposed to a statute or "normal" mile which is 5280 feet. In ancient days, sailors would feed a rope over the side of their ship for a specified amount of time and then measure the number of knots (which had been tied into the rope at regular intervals) that had been pulled overboard. The number of knots pulled over was proportional to the speed of the ship.

Later on, a nautical mile was defined as one minute of arc along a meridian (north-south line) on a nautical chart. This made chart reading easier and was picked up by aviation as a standard navigation protocol since early overwater aviators would have to use the same charts as used for surface navigation.

That all sounds very interesting, but are we really using the GPS readout to determine our takeoff and landing speeds? No. We are not. Airplanes stay in the air by virtue of the wind moving over the wings. Not enough wind, the wing stalls and it drops like a rock. The question is how do we know how much wind is moving over the wing?

Wind Over the Wings

To determine how much wind is flowing over the wings we use an airspeed indicator which is simply a sensor connected by plastic tubing to those odd shaped pointy things you see attached to the fuselage near the front of any airliner. Those are called pitot tubes. The tip of a pitot tube has a small opening which is connected by tubing to a pressure sensor. A measure of the air pressure from the pitot tube when compared to the ambient pressure is proportional to the speed of the aircraft through the air.

Pitot tubes, in combination with static ports (which measure ambient pressure) and their related indicators, are collectively known as the pitot-static system, and constitute one of the most vital systems on any airplane. This is why you usually see so many pitot tubes on the front of airliners. They provide redundancy.

At this point you may be raising an objection: But isn't air a compressible fluid, and wouldn't this compressibility skew the results as, say, temperature changed or other conditions changed? Why yes, yes they would Poindexter. Move to the front row and give yourself a star.

ICE-T (Not a drink from Long Island)

Pilots of a certain age will remember the torture inflicted by their instructors by being required to perform the dreaded "ICE-T" problem using the E6B government issue "whizz wheel" circular slide rule. This usually occurred as they were struggling to realize their dream of being a jet pilot while attempting to not throw up in the flying sterno can known as the T-37 in the west Texas summer heat. ICE-T was not an exotic drink from Long Island, but rather an acronym which stood for Indicated Calibrated Equivalent True airspeed. These terms referred to an airspeed conversion from the indicated speed shown on your panel to your actual velocity through the air known as "true" airspeed.

Performing this calculation was a drawn out process using inputs such as your pressure altitude and  temperature deviation (from a standard day). It was necessary because your "true" airspeed was used in navigation calculations such as time-distance-fuel determinations.

Today, of course, those calculations are all automated by an onboard computer known as the air data inertial reference unit or ADIRU.  This system takes all the pitot static input data and combines it with attitude and position data from the inertial reference units (IRUs) to provide one stop shopping data supply to the pilots' displays, the autopilot, and even the engines which use the data to optimize things like fuel burn.

Do We Have Enough Gas?

Once you know your "true" airspeed or actual velocity through the air, you need to apply your known wind correction to determine your actual velocity across the ground. This is important, because if the headwind is, say, 30 knots stronger than what you planned for, you might not have enough fuel to reach your destination. This can ruin your day on a long overwater leg.

In years gone by, flight plans would be "winded" with the latest forecast from aviation meteorologists. The plan was only as good as the forecast, and fuel needed to be closely monitored to determine if actual headwinds were greater than forecast. INS (inertial navigation) and GPS systems have greatly increased the accuracy of fuel planning as they give real time wind readouts. You instantly know if your plan was accurate.

Wind correction data input, as you might imagine, is also automated on modern transport aircraft and fed into the aircraft's flight management system (FMS) through an automatic data upload.  This system will give you a helpful INSUFFICIENT FUEL warning if it thinks you're not going to make it. Usually this warning means that you fat-fingered your flight plan input and told the airplane that you're going back to your origination as your destination or some similar easily rectified mistake.

In Conclusion

Airspeed is important for reasons beyond satisfying the curiosity of aviation fans. In the immediate short term, it keeps airplanes aloft by informing pilots when they are getting slow, which is an unforgivable sin in aviation. In the long term, knowing ground speed, which is derived from airspeed plus wind inputs, lets pilots know that they will arrive at their destination with enough fuel.

Is the Airline Hub History?

Photo - Eric Salard CC BY-SA 2.0

A reader sent me this article from the Daily Beast (good God, man! What are you reading that for?) which foresees the denouement of the airline hub due to the arrival of a new class of commuter jets which can hop from destination to destination while skipping hubs.

Once those [smaller] jets reach the airlines they will have the same hub-killing effect in the rest of the world as here. Given the choice of flying a straight line from A to B instead of having to change airplanes on the way is a no-brainer in any language.

While the article gives a decent roundup of the recent history of the airline industry and the introduction of smaller yet longer range commuter jets, it should have been written about 15 years ago. The Canadair CRJ-200 first flew in 1991 and along with the Embraer ERJ series of regional aircraft came to dominate the regional airline market through the 2000s.

These smaller, faster jets held promise to both serve smaller markets from fortress hub airports, or to skip the hub entirely and fly point to point. Analysts thought they'd be handy in poaching passengers from a rival's hub as well. As it turned out, the hub killer commuter jet was anything but.

Primarily deployed by regional airlines which wet-leased their aircraft and crews to a major airline partner, commuter jets mostly enhanced hub operations by offering service to smaller "spoke" airports which couldn't support full narrow body service.

Airline hubs have always been inefficient in their use of crews and equipment, but very efficient in revenue generation using the ability to create many different city pairs. Point to point regional operations were never embraced by the major airlines which viewed those operations as subtracting value from sizable investments in their hubs.

The old Canadair and Embraer CRJ and ERJ jets are now being replaced by newer more comfortable "C" and "E" series jets but I don't see the economics changing much. In fact, an ongoing pilot shortage seems to be making some major airlines reconsider their relationships with their regional partners. Bringing their regional operations in-house means that they're more likely to retain the pilots they have brought onto their master seniority lists.

For instance, both United and Delta have recently purchased regional aircraft directly, though United may still have their regional aircraft flown by one of their regional partners.

However it shakes out, it doesn't appear, though, that the airline hub will be going anywhere soon.

Boeing 737 MAX 8 Pilot Report

The Boeing 737 first flew in 1967 and since then has become the world's best selling airliner with Boeing just recently delivering the 10,000th 737 to Southwest Airlines. Major updates and enhancements over the decades mean that the newest generation of 737s, the MAX series, while bearing a family resemblance to the earliest models, is packed with the latest technology in avionics and propulsion.

I recently had the opportunity to fly a 737 MAX 8 for the first time. We had been scheduled to fly a 737-800 for the sequence, so when a MAX 8 showed up I was quite pleasantly surprised. My next concern was whether I'd remember anything about the new features of the airplane. Our differences training had been accomplished months earlier through an online course. As it turned out, there was little to be concerned about as the cockpit displays, while larger, incorporate all of the familiar elements from the NexGen series with a few welcome additions. (The NexGen 737s consist of the 600-900 series first introduced in the late 90s) I felt at home in the MAX cockpit right away.

Pilot's primary NAV display with terrain mode selected

The MAX 8 in our configuration has a 175 seat single class capacity with a standard crew complement of four flight attendants and two pilots. The layout and galleys are very similar to our -800s. There are two lavs aft and one forward. The MAX comes equipped with Boeing's new Sky Interior which features programmable LED lighting and mood music for boarding and deplaning. The seats themselves have adjustable headrests and a generous 32" seat pitch and 17.6" width, the widest of any 737 variant.

Boeing Sky Interior with programmable LED lighting

Moving back up front, the most dramatic feature of the MAX is the cockpit displays. The six 7 inch square display units in the NexGen (NG) aircraft have been replaced by four 15 inch wide display units. Separate mechanical features of the NG such as the flap indicators and clock are now displayed on these larger units. The gear handle and standby flight instruments have been relocated between the center displays and are now equidistant from both pilots.

Preflight, Engine Start, and Taxi Out

We were scheduled to operate as WN 5599 from DCA (Washington Reagan) to MCO (Orlando). The enroute burn was planned at 1+59 and 9000 lbs at an altitude of FL400 or 40,000 ft. The aircraft was carrying two deferred maintenance items, the onboard network system, and the first officer's ILS system resulting in a downgrade to CAT I ILS status. As the weather was VMC at both our departure and destination, this was not a concern.

Our takeoff weight was planned at 144,400 lbs, well below our max allowable of 159,800 lbs departing from runway 1 in DCA. Our maximum takeoff weight was determined by the maximum allowable structural landing weight of 150,800 lbs plus our planned burn of 9000 lbs. The planned fuel was 14,900 lbs which included 2000 lbs of contingency fuel in addition to the standard 45 minutes of  FAR reserve or 3200 lbs. I was immediately impressed in how little fuel it was going to take us to get to Florida.

The LEAP-1B engines deployed on the MAX are 15% more fuel efficient than the CFM56 series engines on the NG aircraft. These efficiencies are the result of an increase in the bypass ratio from five on the CFM56 to nine on the LEAP-1B and an internal pressure ratio increase from 11:1 to 22:1. A significant weight reduction in the rotor of the LEAP-1B adds to the fuel efficiency of the engine but also adds some restrictions on start and shutdown which I'll address later.

Fan blades of the LEAP-1B

Our preflight checks and flows were nearly identical to our NG aircraft. Our clearance from DCA was on the Boock2 RNAV departure. Departing to the north from DC always requires extra vigilance due to the proximity of the prohibited areas around the White House and the Naval Observatory where the vice president's residence is located. The authorities have an extreme lack of understanding and humor should an airliner even brush into one of these areas. The departure requires an immediate left turn after liftoff to track the Potomac. As the wind was gusting out of the northwest, I elected to engage LNAV lateral navigation on the ground to have lateral guidance immediately after takeoff.

Once we were loaded and had clearance from ground control, we started the pushback and start sequence. The restrictions on starting which I noted above now came into play. The rotor, or the spinning center shaft of the engine, had so much weight shaved off that it could have a tendency to bow when hot after shutdown. This bowing could cause the compressor blades to rub against the engine housing resulting in excess wear and possible compressor stalls on start due to air leaking around the gaps.

A view from the wheel well

To mitigate against this thermal bow effect, the computer will motor the engine before introducing fuel during the start sequence. The amount of anti-bow motoring is determined by the computer but can be up to several minutes before the fuel lever can be raised to start each engine. Once started, there is an additional three minute warm up period before takeoff thrust can be applied. This restriction is five minutes when the engine is started cold. There is also a firm three minute cool down period required before shut down as well. These restrictions will most likely not pose a problem except perhaps when you've pushed back onto a taxiway where other aircraft have to wait for you.

The quietness of the aircraft became immediately apparent as soon as the engines were started. It is truly a quiet airplane. I fly with a Bose noise cancelling headset and didn't notice until we were nearly level at 40,000 ft that I hadn't turned on the noise cancelling feature. It was that quiet. The LEAP-1B engine employs the same scalloped or saw tooth pattern on the trailing edge of the cowling that is evident on the 787. This design smooths the mixing of the core and fan airflows, significantly reducing turbulent flow and noise.

Scalloped cowling decreases engine noise (and looks cool)

The aircraft steering had a nice tight feel to it, but any new aircraft should. I won't miss the wobbly shopping-cart nosewheel steering of our old -300s, which were retired last year. We were cleared for takeoff with little delay and were on our way.

Takeoff and Climbout

The takeoff roll was unremarkable save for the quietness of the engines. We had calculated a reduced thrust takeoff power setting, but the aircraft accelerated and lifted off smartly. The LNAV course became active almost immediately and we started our left turnout on the departure. I hand flew the aircraft up to about 18,000 ft before engaging the autopilot. I thought the aircraft responded to manual controls similarly to our 800 series aircraft.

Pilot's inboard display with vertical situation and enhanced engine instrument display

The Boock2 departure tracks north and then makes a right turn for a nice view of the city...from the right seat! We quickly arrived at our cruise altitude of 40,000 ft, turned off the seat belt sign, and had some time to look at the new features on the displays. Other than being nearly twice as large as the NG displays, some new features such as a vertical situation display are included. When activated, this feature displays a side view of the aircraft's altitude and planned vertical navigation. It should come in handy for keeping situational awareness during complicated arrivals or when given a "descend via" clearance.

Descent and Approach

Our flight plan had us flying the Cwrld4 arrival from over Ormond Beach. This arrival set us up nicely for a VFR downwind arrival to Orlando's Rwy 35R. The arrival went smoothly with the autopilot easily staying on path in VNAV. Our arrival weight was very close to the planned 135,400 lbs and we had planned for a flaps 30 visual approach. We were just about abeam the field at perhaps 3000 ft when we got the clearance for a visual approach, my favorite kind of clearance.

Depending on controller preferences and traffic load, some controllers will call your every turn around the pattern. This type of hand holding can be annoying, especially if there is no other traffic in the pattern. Other controllers will just let you go to turn your own base and final. This was one of the other guys and he cut us loose. The key is to not screw it up and fly a bomber (wide) pattern or to cut in so tight that you end up going around.  I disengaged the autopilot and autothrottles, and proceeded to fly the pattern by hand to get a feel for how the MAX flew in the slow speed regime.

The engine instruments display can be selected for either side 

Flying a visual approach cross cockpit can have its own challenges as you can't readily see the runway, which is the primary reference in any visual pattern. Inside cockpit references can be used such as the FMC glidepath, wind arrow, runway DME (distance), and of course the best resource, the guy or gal sitting on that side of the airplane.

I'd been descending on downwind with flaps at position 1 for extra drag. While I'll use the speedbrakes if I need them, my preference is to avoid using them if possible. Pulling the nose up, dropping the gear and extending flaps on schedule is my preferred technique for getting configured quickly. The MAX went through her paces brilliantly and we were lined up on glidepath about three miles out when I brought the power up. While I had to take a second look or two to see the electronic flap gauge and newly positioned gear indicator lights, I quickly adjusted to their new locations.

Landing and Taxi In

The landing was uneventful and rather smooth if I do say so myself. The aircraft decelerated smoothly with the reversers and auto-brakes while the quietness of the engines again made itself apparent. We exited on the high speed and taxied to our gate. We had to start the timer after leaving the runway to ensure that we complied with the mandatory three minute cool down period before shutting down the engines. It wasn't a factor in this case as the taxi time was longer than three minutes.

The LEAP-1B engines are eight inches in diameter larger than the CFM engines on the NG, so in order to maintain the same ground clearance, the nose gear was lengthened about eight inches. This gives a slightly different picture while taxiing, but I found the landing picture to be very similar to the -800. The longer nose strut becomes apparent after lowering the nose to the runway but it was not disconcerting.

APU fairing

After shut down, we had a 45 or so minute turn at the gate before our next leg which was to Philadelphia. I took this time to walk outside and take a few photos of the jet. The most obvious difference in the MAX is the larger engines and slightly different looking winglets than those installed on our -800s. Also different is the APU fairing which resembles that of the 767 or 787 more so than earlier model 737s. Other than that, there are not a lot of obvious tells to set a MAX apart from its NG sistren.

The Mighty MAX Strikes Out

Our flight to Philly was completely full at 175 passengers plus crew. Once loaded and ready to go, we pushed back and went through the lengthened start up process. It was on taxi out to the runway that the MAX let us down. Shortly after leaving the ramp and joining the parallel taxiway to Rwy 35L, the Master Caution and the L Elev Pitot heat light came on. This meant that a fault had occurred in the heating element for the elevator pitot tube which provides airspeed inputs to the elevator feel system.

As Orlando is a maintenance base for us, I made the decision to return to the gate and have our mechanics look at the problem. As it turns out, this malfunction can be deferred through the use of the minimum equipment list (MEL). There are two of these systems installed and only one is required for flight with some restrictions. It was this restriction that sank us.

The mechanics noted that this tail number had a history of this particular malfunction, but they had the deferral paperwork done very quickly and we were ready to go...or so I thought. The next thing we heard over the gate agent's radio was that the airplane was being taken out of service. I quickly called dispatch and our dispatcher didn't even know what was happening. A phone call to the supervisor of dispatch revealed that while the flight to Philly was fine, it was the subsequent flight to Chicago that was the problem.

The restriction for this maintenance deferral was that the aircraft couldn't be operated in forecast or actual icing conditions. And it turns out that the forecast for Chicago was a broken cloud layer with temperatures below freezing. The supervisor of dispatch didn't want the airplane stuck in Philly, so we lost our beautiful MAX. Luckily for us (and 175 passengers), another airplane was available. Tail swapping a full airplane took about an hour, but we were glad to be going again, only this time in an 800 series.

The author in the corner office

In Conclusion

The 737 MAX is loaded with new technology which makes it a pleasure to fly and saves a bunch of money in fuel costs which should make airline managements happy. But even with all the new technology, the airplane is still a 737 at heart and was quite easy to fly. The LEAP-1B engines are whisper quiet and the large displays present data in an elegant and easy to understand format. Of course, as we discovered, there will always be some bugs that need to be squashed in a new system, but I am quite confident that the MAX has a long and productive future in front of her.



Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. All photos by Robert Graves.

Do I Talk Too Much? A Primer on Airline PA Announcements

The chapter in Tom Wolfe's novel, The Right Stuff, which introduces us to Chuck Yeager, starts with this vignette:

Anyone who travels very much on airlines in the United States soon gets to know the voice of the airline pilot—coming over the intercom with a particular drawl, a particular folksiness, a particular down-home calmness that is so exaggerated it begins to parody itself (nevertheless!-it's reassuring) the voice that tells you, as the airliner is caught in thunderheads and goes bolting up and down a thousand feet at a single gulp, to check your seat belts because "it might get a little choppy"...

Wolfe went on to describe how that drawl, which characterizes the "pilot voice", had its genesis in Chuck Yeager's West Virginia cool-as-a-cucumber mein and delivery.

That southern drawl style of voice can still occasionally be heard over an airline PA, but it seems to have been eclipsed in recent years by the nondescript mid-Atlantic patois of most television news anchors. And that is too bad. A certain cachet has been lost in my opinion, but then again, a fake accent is probably worse than no accent.

My real problem with airline PA announcements, however, has nothing to do with the delivery, but rather the content and timeliness. We actually do talk too much when we should probably shut up and not enough when something needs to be said. Let me explain:

Mandatory versus Optional

Pilot PA announcements are prescribed in our manuals as either customer service announcements, which are mostly optional, or required safety announcements, which are mandatory. There is little that can be done about the mandatory safety announcements such as those required when the seat belt sign is cycled on or off, but it is the customer service announcements which can probably use the most improvement.

We are encouraged to give an opening PA to introduce ourselves and to give some information about the flight. My problem starts right away when pilots introduce themselves using first names only such as  "Bob and Tom". Perhaps I'm just old school, but when I hear that, I can't help but think I've tapped into the Wiggles channel, or perhaps wandered into a birthday party at a Chuck E. Cheese joint. Our informality infection has progressed just a bit far. Professionals should try to look and sound the part.

After the introduction comes a several minute soliloquy about the length of the flight, the filed altitude, the expected ride enroute, the destination weather, and those super gals and guys serving you in the back. Perhaps there was a time in years past when this information was not publicly available to anyone who cared to know, but that time has long since passed. Nearly all that information is now easily available on the iPad that every passenger will now have to put down while Captain America, er, Bob, rambles on for interminable minutes.

Opening PAs should be short, to the point, and only offer information that is not already available through the internet or the airplane's entertainment center. If the destination weather must be given, "partly cloudy and breezy" will suffice rather than well, folks, there's a scattered layer at 3000 ft and a broken layer at 12,000 ft with 8 miles of visibility and the winds at 320 degrees at 8 gust 15 knots. Passengers' heads often cock when hearing such details much in the same way as your dog's head does when you try to explain the theory of relativity. Passengers aren't trained in pilot jargon.

Silence is Not Always Golden

Now if things are going to be out of the ordinary, such as being so turbulent that the flight attendants won't be getting out of their seats, or there's an ATC departure delay, then that is worth passing along. This brings us to the times when something needs to be said and yet only golden silence prevails. If the push time is 0900 and it's, say, 0905 and we haven't pushed, a PA should be made to inform the customers that, yes, we know that we're now late, and here's the reason, and here, also, is when we expect to be moving. Not announcing those things makes it seem like the pilots are hoping that no one notices. They do.

This is especially important during lengthy ATC or maintenance delays. If we're stuck at the gate for an extended period of time, I personally like to give an update every 10 to 15 minutes. This won't be a long announcement but rather something along the lines of yes, the mechanics are still working the problem, but we expect that we will eventually be under way in so many minutes.

Honesty is (Usually) the Best Policy

Many pilots prefer to use euphemisms when describing things like turbulence or maintenance issues. I personally prefer an honest but not too detailed description of weather and mechanical issues. If we're expecting moderate turbulence, I'll use that term instead of "really bumpy". If there is a line of thunderstorms ahead, I'll say that. If those terms scramble someone's eggs, perhaps they should not be flying. 

Likewise, if we have a mechanical issue, I'll mention the system that is affected without going into unnecessary detail. "Folks, we have an electrical problem" is probably better understood rather than the number 2 transformer/rectifier is showing zero amperage (usually followed by a detailed discussion of what a T/R even is).

One thing to be careful about concerning maintenance announcements is the subject of deferrals. Most people expect that their airplane is perfectly functional all the time and will likely not understand the concept of redundant systems and deferred maintenance. In those cases, I'll usually announce that the mechanic has the problem squared away and we'll be departing soon.

Apologies

Is there anything more annoying than modern day customer care speak? Endless apologies followed by assurances that your experience and well being are of the highest concern have become a ubiquitous soundtrack to life in our deracinated corporate infused existence. A bit of real talk is a great antidote and is usually well appreciated by people trapped in an aluminum tube for extended periods of time. 

If we (the airline) screwed something up, I like to say so, but if that's not the case, I'll say that as well such as "our good friends at the FAA have instituted a flow control program".  Another annoying tic that I hear occasionally on the PA is the airing of dirty internal laundry such as "well, folks, we're ready to go but the ground ops folks are dragging their feet getting the plane serviced." When speaking to customers, you are the voice of the corporation. They don't know or care about internecine tribal spats.

Flight Attendant Announcements

Admittedly, most of the announcements you hear on an airliner come from the flight attendants. Cut them some slack because most of what they say is mandated by either the corporation or the FAA. And I wholly approve of pre-recorded safety videos that are now becoming common. I'd much rather watch a professionally produced safety video than listen to a harried flight attendant rush through a safety demo for the fourth time that day.  Other announcements such as the mandatory seatbelt sign notification are also being automated on newer aircraft.

Humor of course always has its place in airline PAs, but like wearing Spandex, only certain people can pull it off. Unfortunately, most of those that do, probably shouldn't. Perhaps there should be an audition where aspiring comedians can go through their schtick and get feedback before inflicting their routine on a captive public.

 In Conclusion

Airline PAs should convey valuable and timely information to customers who have no other means of gaining that information. Redundant, rambling, or lengthy announcements merely add insult to the injury of modern air travel. And of course, don't forget to bring your noise cancelling headset.

Air Force to Recall 1000 Retired Pilots

The Air Force has a pilot problem. It doesn't have enough. The service says that the problem is reaching "crisis" levels with a current shortage of 1500 pilots. Having exhausted all means to convince their current pilot force to remain in the service, and unable to increase the number of new pilots produced, the Air Force appealed to the President to revise an executive order allowing for the recall of up to 1000 retired pilots to active duty. President Trump signed this order last Friday touching off a firestorm of social media commentary.

In many ways, this problem has existed for decades, even stretching back to the 1980s when I first wore the green bag (flight suit). The issues are the same and the same arguments get made over and over. What has changed is simply the intensity of each issue affecting pilot retention. As the saying goes, you can't tell who's swimming naked until the tide goes out. And the tide has indeed gone out.

Inflow Minus Outflow

Air Force personnel managers are charged with managing the pilot force to maintain appropriate force levels. They not only manage the total number of pilots, but also the personnel levels existing at various career stages. They attempt to keep a surplus or deficit from existing anywhere along the career "pipeline". Tools at their disposal are the management of training rates, promotion rates, and incentive programs used to either retain pilots or to encourage them to separate.

Looking at the inflows, the number of pilots that the Air Force can train in a given year, there was a huge reduction in initial pilot training capacity dating from the end of the cold war. Training bases were closed and resources were reassigned. Total pilot production was reduced from about 1500 to 500 pilots annually in the early 1990s. That number has recovered somewhat; about 1100 pilots were produced in 2016. The Air Force is attempting to ramp this production back up, but planners estimate that a maximum of 1400 pilots per year is the ceiling given current numbers of training aircraft and other resources.

It is on the outflow side, however, that the problem becomes clear. In short, pilots are bailing out of the military to take airline jobs—just as they always have when the airlines come a calling. It is here where the pilot retention problem really looks like a rewind of the 1980s. Back in the late eighties, the airlines were on a hiring tear, scooping up as many ex-military pilots as they could get their hands on. 

I specifically recall being asked to participate in a round table discussion with the wing commander to address the issues of why pilots were leaving the service. The complaints I heard back then are eerily similar to the ones being voiced today. Pilots chafed at too many non-flying additional duties (affectionately known as "queep"), not enough flying time, and a lack of leadership. Here is an example of the unrest from the comments of my blog (in the original):

...additional duties that have nothing to do with flying, PME (professional military education-ed) requirements to get promoted that have to be accomplished in off duty spare time, 24/7 on call status, exercises that have little to do with flying, PT (physical training-ed) requirements that have to be prepared for in spare time, mountains of regulations based on a single act of buffoonery with the goal of preventing bad judgement from ever happening again, i.e. The Shotgun Approach to problem solving, time off is time off. Not everyone wants to be a four star general/politician/professional staff officer but, the senior AF brass expect everyone to jump through time wasting hoops to be prepared for that minute possibility.

One factor which currently helps to push pilots out of the service which largely did not exist back in the 1980s is the deployment rate. Deployments, or long term tours away from home lasting weeks or months, are now the rule rather than the exception. Air Force pilots flying tactical or theater based aircraft can expect multiple, lengthy, deployments during their career. No amount of incentive money will likely dissuade these pilots from exiting the service once their service commitment is over.

When the Airlines Hire, Pilots Leave

So are pilots actually leaving the service in numbers greater than they have in past airline hiring surges? A 2015 Rand study which examined the issue of fighter pilot retention, defined a measure of total active rated service (TARS) to measure the retention of pilots. Denoted in years, it measures the average length of time a pilot remains on active duty.

As you can see, the rate at which pilots leave the service (thereby shortening their active duty years) roughly corresponds with airline hiring, verifying that in spite of conditions in the military, when the airlines are hiring, pilots will leave.

This makes sense for many reasons. At the 10 year point of a military pilot's career, there are often many lifestyle changes including marriage and children. The excitement and travel which provide much of the allure of being a military pilot may have lost their lustre. The early part of a military pilot's career involves becoming an expert in the operation of their weapons system, but as time progresses, the focus will switch to grooming for leadership positions and away from flying.

At work here also is the psychology of the airline seniority system. Nearly every measure of quality of life in the airlines is determined by one's seniority, or hire date. Logic dictates that if a pilot has decided to eventually go the airline route, an earlier rather than later departure from the military will be better. This "fear of missing out" no doubt drives many pilots off the fence onto the side of the airlines, but it also presents an opportunity to help solve the problem.

Can it be Fixed?

Anything can be fixed given enough money and imagination, which unfortunately, seem to be in short supply these days. From a merely economic point of view, matching airline pay rates dollar for dollar might help, but the calculus would then be why work harder for the same money? To beat this problem with money will require quite a bit more than the military is willing (or able) to pay.

To their credit, Air Force leadership has recognized the toll that nonstop deployments have taken on the force and are moving to reduce them. Other initiatives include keeping pilots in the cockpit and out of staff positions by utilizing non-pilots for those staff positions.

One possible solution to the airline seniority problem might be for the airlines to interview, provisionally hire, and guarantee military pilots a seniority position based on that interview date. This type of program would mirror the "flow-through" programs which some regional airlines have with their mainline counterparts.

Requiring a longer service commitment seems to be a well that has run dry. Currently at 10 years from completion of training (up from six when I joined in 1982), the length of that commitment will eventually dissuade the best and brightest who have other options. 

Then, of course, there is the brute force method, of which an involuntary recall of retired pilots would be a showpiece. Other levers include the use of a "stop-loss" program which simply closes the door to pilots leaving the service prior to retirement. Invocation of a stop-loss seems the more likely course in lieu of a retirement recall. I have personal experience with that, being prevented from retiring for awhile back in 2003.

The last policy prescription I'll offer is to simply define the problem away. It still escapes me as to why we're deploying state of the art fighters against Pashtun goat herders in the Hindu Kush, especially when the place will look like we were never there a year after we leave.

In Conclusion

The Air Force's pilot retention problem is the same as it ever was. When the airlines hire, pilots leave. The complaints about the service being made today echo not only those I heard back in the 1980s, but also those of Joseph Heller's Yossarian voiced in Catch 22. Creative management and incentives will help stop the bleeding, but the tide of a world wide pilot shortage is a powerful force.

Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft.

The Real Reason that Southwest Just Announced Hawaii

As you probably know by now, Southwest Airlines announced their intention to serve Hawaii this past Wednesday night. There has been speculation about if and when Southwest Airlines would begin service to Hawaii for years. Driving these rumors is the fact that they've been removing many of the obstacles holding them back from flying to the islands.

For instance, flying long distances over water requires specially equipped and maintained aircraft. Known as Extended Operations (ETOPS) certification, the aircraft and crew have to demonstrate an ability to lose an engine and to safely divert to an alternate airport. Southwest has been operating ETOPS compliant aircraft, and trained their crews in over water navigation procedures several years ago. So why did they wait so long to start service?

One reason to not serve the Hawaiian Islands is that it is a very difficult market in which to make money. This may seem counterintuitive as Hawaii is one of the premier vacation destinations in the world, but let me explain.

Leisure or Business?

Airlines rely on two types of passengers to make money: business and leisure. Business passengers are by far the more profitable customers as they are usually on a tight timeline, and are not generally flexible in their travel plans. Many times they have to travel at the last minute. These factors mean that airlines can charge business passengers a lot of money which ends up making them high margin customers.

Leisure passengers, on the other hand, often plan their vacations well in advance, and are more cost conscious as opposed to time sensitive. Add in that money used for vacations is discretionary, meaning that a small increase in cost may mean going to a cheaper destination or not going at all, and you can see that airlines are competing for these passengers on price. The leisure market ends up being a high volume, but low margin business. And Hawaii is the quintessential leisure market.

Another factor in the Hawaiian market is of the airlines' own making. That factor is their loyalty programs. Decades ago, the airlines figured out that giving away free flights to loyal customers was a great way to keep those customers from jumping ship (so to speak) to another carrier which beat them by a few bucks on price. One of the premier destinations for loyalty program redemptions, however, was Hawaii. This meant that the airlines found themselves flying full airplanes to the islands with very few paying customers, a huge number of them being redeemed "miles" flights.

The type of aircraft being flown can also affect the profitability of a particular market. Wide-body aircraft carrying several hundred passengers enjoy an economy of scale which lowers costs. The fixed costs of maintaining gates and ticket counters are essentially the same for all airliners, so an airline flying wide-body aircraft can spread those costs over more customers. This is a disadvantage for airlines with only narrow-body aircraft such as Alaska and Southwest.

All of these reasons have made Hawaii a difficult market that up to now Southwest has elected to forego. But something made them change their mind, and that something was from outside their company.

It's War!

In April of 2016, Alaska Airlines announced their intention to acquire Virgin America creating a west coast powerhouse airline with national aspirations. For decades, Alaska was content to serve their fiercely defended home turf of Alaska from their Seattle hub, along with west coast routes including Mexico, while only occasionally venturing east of the Mississippi.

The addition of the Virgin America network added a robust transcontinental capacity giving the new entity a significant east coast footprint. They also decided that the time was good to challenge Southwest for primacy in one of the largest markets in the country: California.

Southwest has long been the primary carrier for California intrastate travel having wrested the old PSA routes away from USAir back in the early '90s. Flying California intrastate routes as many as six times daily, Southwest has more or less had that market sewn up until earlier this year. Starting in March, Alaska announced new service and frequency to cities such as Burbank and Sacramento, Southwest strongholds. A fare war has subsequently broken out with fares as low as $57 for intrastate travel.

No Holds Barred

Fare wars, while good for airline travellers while they last, can be brutal to the bottom line. Alaska did not start this fight without intending to either win, (unlikely) or at least to grab a good chunk of Southwest's California market share. A war of attrition will batter both airlines' financial results even though Southwest is somewhat better positioned to prevail as they have lower overall costs than Alaska.

Alaska, though, does have some tricks up their sleeve which will keep them in the fight. One is that they have codeshare agreements with 15 other airlines to include large international carriers like British Airways and Emirates. Southwest does not codeshare at all. Funneling passengers into a worldwide network brings in revenue and exposes their product to more potential customers.

The other feature that Alaska has is Hawaii. They've been flying there for years, even though it may not be a huge revenue generator. And this is an ace in the hole when you are fighting for California. As it turns out, over half of all Hawaii tourists originate from California. 

The whole point of loyalty programs is to capture customers who will then fly one particular airline for both business and leisure travel. When you are trying to build brand loyalty, as Southwest is, not serving one of the largest nearby leisure destinations means that you are inviting your customers to fly on your biggest competitor. This is the real reason that Southwest has finally decided to fly to Hawaii.

In Conclusion

A fare war over California means that there are huge consequences at stake. Alaska is attempting to establish a larger presence on the west coast after their merger with Virgin America, while Southwest does not intend to let one of their largest markets be challenged. In order to compete against this new attack, Southwest has to offer their customers access to Hawaii unless they want to see their customers fly on the competition for both business and leisure.

Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. Any opinions expressed are solely his.